

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL

Action

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SR

FROM: KARACHI

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TO: Secretary of State  
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REFERENCE: CIRCULAR 316

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1) POUCH MESSAGES NOW ARRIVING ALONG WITH OTHER GUIDANCE ARE FILLING PRINCIPAL INFORMATIONAL GAPS REGARDING CUBAN AFFAIR.

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2) COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA GAMBITS INITIALLY MOST EFFECTIVE WERE (A) SOVIET BASE IN CUBA SAME AS UNITED STATES BASES RINGING USSR; (B) UNITED STATES ACTED ONLY IN SELFISH INTERESTS AND NOT IN INTEREST OTHER FREE NATIONS -- CUBA PURELY A REGIONAL PROBLEM; (C) UNITED STATES ACTION ANOTHER DISPLAY OF AMERICAN BRINKMANSHIP.

RMR

3) DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING SINO-INDIAN CLASH PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE HERE AND HAVE IN RECENT DAYS FAR OVERSHADOWED CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS. WHILE OUR ACTION REGARDING CUBA ASSUREDLY HAS GIVEN US ADDED STATURE HERE, THIS OFFSET IN PAK EYES PARTICULARLY BY OUR UNWILLINGNESS PUT APPROPRIATE PRESSURES ON INDIA NOW FOR KASHMIR SETTLEMENT AND BY OUR PROVISION ARMS AID TO INDIA. THUS IF WE ARE TO EXPLOIT PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES ESPECIALLY IN PAKISTAN, SOLUTION KASHMIR PROBLEM PARTICULARLY NEEDED. WHILE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL WORK INITIALLY SOLVE LESSER DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, SOLUTION KASHMIR KEY TO MOLDING SOLID FRONT IN SUBCONTINENT AGAINST SINO-SOVIE THREAT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/ME

MC CONAUGHEY

*Abdullah*

DATE 3/9/88

REVIEWED by Abdullah DATE 3/9/88

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